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BITCOIN AND THE RISE OF DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 “[I]t makes most sense to see Bitcoin […] as a decentralized autonomous organization.” 
Vitalik Buterin, Industry Expert, Co-founder of Ethereum and Co-founder of Bitcoin Magazine  
 
ABSTRACT 
Bitcoin represents the first real-world implementation of a “decentralized autonomous 
organization” (DAO) and offers a new paradigm for organization design. Imagine working for a 
global business organization whose routine tasks are powered by a software protocol instead of 
being governed by managers and employees. Task assignments and rewards are randomized by the 
algorithm. Information is not channelled through a hierarchy but recorded transparently and 
securely on an immutable public ledger called “blockchain”. Further, the organization decides on 
design and strategy changes through a democratic voting process involving a previously unseen class 
of stakeholders called “miners”. Agreements need to be reached at the organizational level for any 
proposed protocol changes to be approved and activated. 
How do DAOs solve the universal problem of organizing with such novel solutions? What 
are the implications? We use Bitcoin as an example to shed light on how a DAO works in the 
cryptocurrency industry, where it provides a peer-to-peer, decentralized and disintermediated 
payment system that can compete against traditional financial institutions. We also invite 
commentaries from renowned organization scholars to share their views on this intriguing 
phenomenon. 
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WHAT IS BITCOIN? 
Bitcoin is an open source software code that implements a decentralized, peer-to-peer digital 
cash payment system that does not require any trusted intermediaries to operate (e.g., banks or 
payment companies). The Bitcoin Whitepaper was published in 2008 by a developer (or 
development team) under the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto, and was soon followed by the first 
ever “coin” created in the form of a digital record in 2009. At the time of writing (October 2017), 
Bitcoin hit another record high price of over $4,400, forming an economy of $73 billion.  
Initially, Bitcoin’s design aimed to solve the inherent inefficiencies and agency problems 
arising from the intermediated and centralized banking model. Typically, to make an international 
wire transfer between, say, Canada and China, the money goes through four different banks 
(including two “correspondent” banks), two national payments systems, and an international 
settlement service (e.g., SWIFT). A standard international payment takes between 3 and 15 business 
days to complete, depending on the destination country, and involves multiple agents such as bank 
tellers, employees, and managers from the aforementioned financial institutions. Expensive bank 
fees and exchange rates apply.  
By contrast, Bitcoin is distributed in cyberspace across thousands of network nodes, and is 
inherently borderless. Payments are validated and updated by the network every 10 minutes. 
Intermediaries are not required (e.g. no correspondent banks are required). There are no bank fees 
for transactions, but users typically pay a small fee to payment validators (known as “miners”- to be 
discussed further below). Whereas for an international transfer of $5,000, a bank wiring would 
charge a fee of around $125, a fee of around $1 would be expected for a Bitcoin transfer. It is no 
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wonder, that Bitcoin is seen as a potentially significant disruptor of the current financial system 
based on banking.3  
BITCOIN AS A “DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION” (DAO) 
Bitcoin “runs a payment system…employs subcontractors who are miners… paid for with 
newly issued bitcoin shares in itself” (Vigna & Casey, 2015:229, quoting Larimer, 2013)4. The Bitcoin 
system thus shares the four core features common to all conceptualizations of “organizations”: it is a 
“multi-agent system […] with identifiable boundaries and [a] purpose […] towards which the 
constituent agents’ efforts make a contribution” (Puranam 2017: 6). But in contrast to traditional 
organizations, Bitcoin does not have a CEO or top management team but instead developers who 
“write the rulebook,” i.e., define governance rules for the program (Narayanan, Bonneau, Felten, 
Miller & Goldfeder, 2016: 173-175); Bitcoin does not have headquarters, subsidiaries, or employees, 
but a distributed network of users and miners who collect, verify, and update transactions on a 
shared public ledger that is publicly auditable. Decisions on code modifications are made through 
community-based democratic voting processes, backed by miners’ computing power for 
implementation (Narayanan et al., 2016: 173-175).  
Two significant innovations underpin Bitcoin: a technological one, namely the public and 
distributed ledger technology called “blockchain”, which securely maintains an immutable record of 
all user transactions; and an organizational innovation, namely, the existence of an open network of 
users with special roles and rights called “miners”, who lend computing power to secure the network 
in exchange for newly minted bitcoins and voting rights with respect to future protocol revisions 




4	Daniel	 Larimer,	 founder	 of	 Bitshare,	 first	 coined	 the	 term	 “decentralized	 autonomous	 corporation”	




These innovations have led some industry experts to conceive of the Bitcoin system as the 
first real-world implementation of a new type of organization called “decentralized autonomous 
organization” (hereafter, DAO). Following prior work, we define DAOs as non-hierarchical 
organizations that perform and record routine tasks on a peer-to-peer, cryptographically secure, public network, and 
rely on the voluntary contributions of their internal stakeholders to operate, manage, and evolve the organization 
through a democratic consultation process (Van Valkenburgh, Dietz, De Filippi, Shadab, Xethalis & Bollier, 
2015; Dietz, Xethalis, De Filippi & Hazard, accessed 2016)5. DAOs coordinate routine tasks through 
cryptographic routines (as opposed to human routines). Open source code defines rules for miners 
to agree on a shared history of transactions recorded securely and redundantly across network nodes, 
in order to avoid having a single point of failure (Nakamoto, 2008). While Bitcoin was the first 
instance to be identified as a DAO, a few hundred more have then been created since 2009 (e.g. 
Ethereum, Litecoin). 
BITCOIN vs. BANKS 
Bitcoin represents a partial substitute for banks, albeit with notable differences.  
First, one cannot open a bank account without providing a number of official identification 
documents, which in the developing world often prevents access to banking. By contrast, anyone 
can become a Bitcoin user and freely obtain a pseudonymous Bitcoin address (i.e., analogous to a 
bank account) not tied ex ante to a real-world identity. In essence, a Bitcoin address is a public key 
cryptographically linked to a private key acting as a password to spend funds. This enables a new 
privacy model that separates identity from transactions (Nakamoto, 2008). The vertical bar in Figure 
1 demonstrates where Bitcoin breaks the information flow as compared to banks.  
																																								 																				
5	While	some	industry	experts	prefer	the	term	“distributed	organization”	over	DAO,	we	opted	for	DAO	to	avoid	confusion,	since	




Second, at an aggregate level, traditional banks store transaction histories in a centralized 
fashion. Users only get to view their personal bank statements and must trust that their information 
is protected from both cyberattacks and employee misconduct. Traditionally, banks employ bank 
clerks to process payments. Human agents are prone to agency problems which can lead to 
misconduct such as theft. The cost of paying the human agents is also not trivial. With Bitcoin, all 
transactions are recorded publicly and electronically onto the immutable “blockchain” stored in a 
distributed fashion across thousands of network nodes – thereby making records easier to maintain 
and cyberattacks unlikely to succeed (because the information on transactions in this case is not held 
in one central location). The blockchain technology provides the multi-site copies of “ledgers”- 
which are really aggregations of past transactions (e.g. like a bank account statement). It also 
provides encryption to validate transactions as valid or invalid (E.g. like personal security device we 
currently use for online banking, which generate a unique transaction specific signature based on a 
personal key).  
Whereas banks prevent double-spending by checking for funds sufficiency in a centralized 
server, in a peer-to-peer system like Bitcoin, payees cannot verify whether payers still have the funds 
they claim to have due to unpredictable network delays (e.g. an email sent now can reach its 
recipient before another email sent a minute earlier). To resolve this issue, Bitcoin relies on 
cryptographic routines to verify, timestamp, and order transactions in a non-reversible way, thereby 
avoiding the need for human reconciliation. This process is called “mining”. The key idea is that 
somebody in the network will legitimately time stamp a block of transactions, but we cannot predict 
who that will be (e.g. replacing a bank clerk, who can be corrupted to fake time stamps, with a 
system that cannot be corrupted).  
Bitcoin “hires” miners to process transactions in this way through a “competitive 
bookkeeping” process (Yermack, 2017). Mining is a process whereby specific network nodes 
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(“miners”) arrange new transactions into a sequence, and time-stamp them by solving a puzzle of 
sorts: by guessing an arbitrarily long number after making billions of random guesses. The guessing 
process can be made faster by committing more computing power to the network. Thus, a miner’s 
probability of being able to provide the “proof-of-work” required to update the ledger is 
proportional to the computing power s/he controls. The computing power committed every ten 
minutes to blocks of transactions recorded in the ledger accumulates and forms a barrier to hacking, 
making it practically impossible to edit past transaction records contained in the blockchain (i.e. the 
proof-of-work would have to be entirely redone for every block added after the edited one, which is 
too computationally intensive and too costly to achieve). Miners get rewarded in Bitcoin for their 
work, which involves costs in hardware and electricity, as per the Bitcoin protocol.  
CONSENSUS MECHANISMS: NOVEL SOLUTIONS TO THE UNIVERSAL 
PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZING 
 Whereas mining organizes Bitcoin payment processing, “humans must first decide what 
protocol to run before the machines can enforce it (Lopp, 2016)”. To distinguish the logic of 
blockchain from its governance and re-design process, we define machine consensus as the process 
whereby blockchain produces agreement (aided by miners efforts) on the ordering of transactions 
through the time-stamping created by miners succeeding at guessing random  number; and social 
consensus as the process whereby miners vote on protocol update proposals introduced by volunteer 
developers. Machine consensus and social consensus fuel Bitcoin’s novel organizational model and 
become integrated through the unique mining process based on computing power provision.  
Machine Consensus: the Bitcoin Payment System 
Proof-of-work mining is a computationally intensive and highly redundant process that 
generates inefficiencies in terms of energy consumption. But as a result, the blockchain record 
cannot be tampered with at a profit. With machine consensus, tasks are allocated based on 
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commitments in computing power, and rewarded competitively based on the outcome of mining. 
All mining-related data are publicly auditable for the entire network. Table 1 shows how Bitcoin as a 
payment system organizes differently from banks and payment organizations.  
Social Consensus: Protocol Upgrades  
Underlying the Bitcoin payment system is the blockchain software supported by ongoing 
protocol updates (Wang & Vergne, 2017). In terms of governance, miners’ voting on protocol 
update proposals resembles the community-based management of Open Source Software 
Development (OSSD) observed for projects such as Linux. It aligns stakeholder expectations (Lopp, 
2016) and facilitates knowledge sharing, problem solving, and the realization of collective outcomes 
(O’Mahony & Lakhani, 2009). Like OSSD, Bitcoin software development is also open source, 
decentralized, and community-based. Bitcoin communities of volunteer software developers 
collaborate in a non-hierarchical network and self-select into tasks and roles based on expertise and 
preferences. Over time, a team of core Bitcoin developers has formed and become increasingly 
influential in the community, even though their work is not funded by a centralized organization, 
but by a sponsorship program that relies on donations.  
The key organizational novelty of Bitcoin as compared to OSSD is that in addition to 
developers, miners play an equally important role in protocol modifications. Specifically, the Bitcoin 
software is updated through Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs), which are design documents 
proposing new features, changes, or processes for the protocol. BIPs allow developers to make 
proposals on software updates that miners must vote on to trigger implementation. Proposals are 
first reviewed by BIP editors, and miners then include a “yes” or “no” vote in a block during the 
polling period (e.g., 100 blocks starting today, namely a 1,000 minutes period). Voting power is 
proportional to the computing power a miner contributes to the network. A code change will only 
be implemented when a majority of 55% is obtained for a given proposal (Franco, 2014: 90). Table 2 
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compares Bitcoin software development with OSSD along four core dimensions of organizing: task 
division, task allocation, reward distribution, and information flow (Puranam, Alexy & Reitzig, 2014). 
Bitcoin’s true organizational novelty lies in how mining determines task division (based on 
computing power contribution), task allocation and reward distribution (through competitive 
bookkeeping), and information flows (on the blockchain and in the network). While task integration 
in traditional settings focuses on rules and processes designed in large part by managers (Okhuysen 
& Bechky, 2009), with Bitcoin, machine consensus (e.g. competitive bookkeeping) and social 
consensus (e.g. voting) are coordinated through miners—a brand new class of stakeholders.  
Miners consent to playing by the rulebook, but they can vote to change it using the influence 
derived from their computing power. However, it is important to note that the Bitcoin code does 
not assume away the problem of agency costs. Rather, Bitcoin explicitly deals with these long-
standing problems by incorporating counterbalancing incentives in the code, making the payment 
system incorruptible.  
In contrast to OSSD contexts, Bitcoin relies on a mixed community of volunteer developers 
and paid miners who jointly revise the organizational design through BIPs. Put simply, Bitcoin 
offers a novel solution to “the universal problems of organizing” (Puranam et al., 2014) by involving 
a new class of stakeholders, incentivized by both machine consensus algorithms and social 
consensus routines, with the design of an organization whose parameters cannot be changed 
unilaterally by any stakeholder group, and whose routine operations cannot be derailed by insiders’ 
covert misconduct.  
SIMILAR BLOCKCHAIN IMPLEMENTATIONS: CRYPTOCURRENCIES 
Bitcoin is the first and most established DAO implemented to date. Since Bitcoin, there 
have been over 800 other DAOs created based on similar designs, most of which are considered to 
be “cryptocurrencies” (i.e., like Bitcoin, they allow for value exchange). At the time of writing, 
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cryptocurrencies form an economy of $110 billion and make a real impact on the world. Some 
cryptocurrencies are developed based on the Bitcoin source code (e.g., Litecoin, Namecoin, Dash), 
while others started from scratch with their own protocol (e.g., Monero, Ethereum). Variations have 
also emerged to embrace a wider range of applications other than just payments, such as 
decentralized domain registration (Namecoin), smart contracts (Ethereum), and privacy (Monero). 
Proof-of-work mining is not anymore the only way to achieve machine consensus, as alternative or 
complementary schemes such as proof-of-stake (whereby the security proof is based on the amount 
of cryptocurrencies payment validators hold) or proof-of-burn (whereby the network is secured by 
validators allocating coins to an unspendable address) have been developed and implemented in 
recent years. Preliminary research suggests that DAO performance varies with the extent of 
governance decentralization (Hsieh, Vergne & Wang, 2017), so understanding how various forms of 
machine and social consensus contribute to the success and failure of DAOs represents an exciting 
avenue for future organizational research. 
COMPANIES OF THE FUTURE? 
Research indicates that the technological innovation potential behind cryptocurrencies 
stands as the key driver of their market value (Wang & Vergne, 2017). But, as the Economist (2015) 
rightly points out, blockchain technology has far-reaching applications beyond cryptocurrencies and 
payments. In fact, blockchain-based organizing and the resulting DAOs have the ability to replace 
centralized intermediaries in other applications requiring complex coordination such as asset 
ownership tracking, trade financing, digital identity provision, supply chain traceability, and more. 
Besides, in the last three years, more than fifty new ventures  received seed funding using 
blockchain-powered “initial coin offerings”, thereby bypassing, at least partly, the use of venture 
capitalist intermediaries to obtain funding faster and at more favorable valuations (e.g. in 2014, 
Ethereum raised $18.4 million in a few days and is now valued at $34 billion). DAOs are on the rise, 
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and it is an exciting time for management and organizational scholars to address this emerging 
phenomenon with new theory and solid empirical research.   
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FIGURE AND TABLES 
Figure 1    Traditional Privacy Model vs. the Bitcoin Privacy Model (adopted from Nakamoto, 2008)  
Traditional Privacy Model 
 
New Privacy Model 
 
Table 1   Banks and Payment Organizations vs. Bitcoin on their Forms of Organizing 
Goal Provision of a Payment System 
 Banks and Payment Organizations Bitcoin 
Mechanism Centralized hierarchies Mining: Competitive bookkeeping 
Task 
Division 
Centralized task division by job 
descriptions/ definitions, divided by 
formal organizational structure  
Task division is based on the criterion of computing 
power dedicated for mining, and is automated by the 
blockchain software in a decentralized fashion. 
Task 
Allocation 
Assigned by formal hierarchies Miners self-select into the network. However, 
competitive bookkeeping only allocates payment 
validation tasks to the winning miner (essentially 
chosen at random, though the probability of 




Defined by formal compensation/ 
incentive programs. In general, reward 
schemes are not publicly available.  
Automated, randomized, transparent. Linked with 
task allocation through competitive bookkeeping.  
Information 
Flow  
Centrally controlled by organizational 
rules. Inconsistencies can persist 
across teams, divisions, or subsidiaries.  
Transaction history is recorded in the blockchain, 
which is publicly auditable and immutable. 
Information is distributed among network nodes 






Table 2   Updating Software Protocol: Open-Source Software Development vs. Bitcoin 
Goal                                                                                Protocol Update 
 OSSD Bitcoin (BIP) 




Some centralization based on the 
structure provided by the founder; 
evolvable with community. 
Founder is unknown; BIPs proposed by developers 
and voted on by miners coordinate code 
modification. Centralization is undesirable. 
Task 
Allocation 
Open participation through self-
selection into the community 
Developers contribute to code upgrades through 
open participation and self-selection. Miners vote on 




professionalism, visibility,  
Developers volunteer and are motivated by intrinsic 
motivation. Miners are paid in Bitcoin and are driven 
by mining profitability. 
Information 
Flow  
Information is processed through 
“virtual support infrastructure and 
tools” (Puranam et al., 2014) 
Information is shared and communicated through 
BIPs communication on the code repository (i.e., 
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